Wednesday, September 29, 2010

Zeus "Mitmo" Attack

It seems that hackers have found a way to get around yet another security measure. The hackers behind the infamous Zeus trojan have been able to successfully exploit text messages that banks send to users as a second form of authentication for account transactions. In order for this to work, the Zeus trojan must first invade a user’s PC. Then, users are led to a website that advertises a security update for their cell phone. In order to receive this supposed update, the user then enters their cell phone number, model, and vendor.


Zeus uses this information to send a text message to the person’s phone that contains a link to their “security certificate.” Once the user clicks on the link to download this “certificate,” the mobile version of Zeus is installed on their phone. This allows Zeus to monitor any incoming messages and installs a “backdoor” to accept and carry out commands received through text messages.


Once all of this occurs, the hacker has all he/she needs to make transactions with the user’s bank account. They simply have to log in using the stolen username and password and command the user’s mobile phone to send them the authentication text message so they can fill it in. This is sometimes referred to as a “Mitmo” or “Man in the Mobile” attack, and so far it has only affected Blackberry and Symbian phones.


I think that it is extremely important for users of online banking services to frequently monitor their account transactions and report anything that does not look familiar. Users should also be extremely wary about entering any kind of information (such as their phone model and number) into a website. If a website claims to be offering a security update for your phone, it would probably be wise to contact the phone company first to make sure that it is a valid update.

As for the phone companies, I think it would be helpful if they followed Apple’s lead in requiring all extra installations and applications to go directly through Apple (via iTunes) instead of any outside sources. As the article mentions, this has protected the iPhone from many of these kinds of problems. It is also important for banks to continue to create new and more secure ways of authentication for transactions in order to remain one step ahead of the hackers.



http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Banking-trojan-ZeuS-homes-in-on-SMS-TAN-process-1097104.html
http://www.scmagazineuk.com/mobiles-used-by-zeus-as-sms-messages-are-used-to-deliver-one-time-passwords/article/179764/

Thursday, September 23, 2010

Stuxnet worm 'targeted high-value Iranian assets'

One of the most sophisticated pieces of malware ever detected was probably targeting "high value" infrastructure in Iran, experts have told the BBC.

Stuxnet's complexity suggests it could only have been written by a "nation state", some researchers have claimed.

It is believed to be the first-known worm designed to target real-world infrastructure such as power stations, water plants and industrial units.

It was first detected in June and has been intensely studied ever since.

"The fact that we see so many more infections in Iran than anywhere else in the world makes us think this threat was targeted at Iran and that there was something in Iran that was of very, very high value to whomever wrote it," Liam O'Murchu of security firm Symantec, who has tracked the worm since it was first detected, told BBC News.

Some have speculated that it could have been aimed at disrupting Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant or the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz.

However, Mr O'Murchu and others, such as security expert Bruce Schneier, have said that there was currently not enough evidence to draw conclusions about what its intended target was or who had written it.

India and Indonesia have also seen relatively high infection rates, according to Symantec.

'Rare package'

Stuxnet was first detected in June by a security firm based in Belarus, but may have been circulating since 2009.

Unlike most viruses, the worm targets systems that are traditionally not connected to the internet for security reasons.

Instead it infects Windows machines via USB keys - commonly used to move files around - infected with malware.

Once it has infected a machine on a firm's internal network, it seeks out a specific configuration of industrial control software made by Siemens.
Siemens factory The worm searches out industrial systems made by Siemens

Once hijacked, the code can reprogram so-called PLC (programmable logic control) software to give attached industrial machinery new instructions.

"[PLCs] turn on and off motors, monitor temperature, turn on coolers if a gauge goes over a certain temperature," said Mr O'Murchu.

"Those have never been attacked before that we have seen."

If it does not find the specific configuration, the virus remains relatively benign.

However, the worm has also raised eyebrows because of the complexity of the code used and the fact that it bundled so many different techniques into one payload.

"There are a lot of new, unknown techniques being used that we have never seen before," he said These include tricks to hide itself on PLCs and USB sticks as well as up to six different methods that allowed it to spread.

In addition, it exploited several previously unknown and unpatched vulnerabilities in Windows, known as zero-day exploits.

"It is rare to see an attack using one zero-day exploit," Mikko Hypponen, chief research officer at security firm F-Secure, told BBC News. "Stuxnet used not one, not two, but four."

He said cybercriminals and "everyday hackers" valued zero-day exploits and would not "waste" them by bundling so many together.

Microsoft has so far patched two of the flaws.

'Nation state'

Mr O'Murchu agreed and said that his analysis suggested that whoever had created the worm had put a "huge effort" into it.

"It is a very big project, it is very well planned, it is very well funded," he said. "It has an incredible amount of code just to infect those machines."

"There have been no instances where production operations have been influenced or where a plant has failed” Siemen's spokesperson

His analysis is backed up by other research done by security firms and computer experts.

"With the forensics we now have it is evident and provable that Stuxnet is a directed sabotage attack involving heavy insider knowledge," said Ralph Langer, an industrial computer expert in an analysis he published on the web.

"This is not some hacker sitting in the basement of his parents' house. To me, it seems that the resources needed to stage this attack point to a nation state," he wrote.

Mr Langer, who declined to be interviewed by the BBC, has drawn a lot of attention for suggesting that Stuxnet could have been targeting the Bushehr nuclear plant.

In particular, he has highlighted a photograph reportedly taken inside the plant that suggests it used the targeted control systems, although they were "not properly licensed and configured".

Mr O'Murchu said no firm conclusions could be drawn.

However, he hopes that will change when he releases his analysis at a conference in Vancouver next week.

"We are not familiar with what configurations are used in different industries," he said.

Instead, he hopes that other experts will be able to pore over their research and pinpoint the exact configuration needed and where that is used.

'Limited success'

A spokesperson for Siemens, the maker of the targeted systems, said it would not comment on "speculations about the target of the virus".

He said that Iran's nuclear power plant had been built with help from a Russian contractor and that Siemens was not involved.

"Siemens was neither involved in the reconstruction of Bushehr or any nuclear plant construction in Iran, nor delivered any software or control system," he said. "Siemens left the country nearly 30 years ago."

Siemens said that it was only aware of 15 infections that had made their way on to control systems in factories, mostly in Germany. Symantec's geographical analysis of the worm's spread also looked at infected PCs.

"There have been no instances where production operations have been influenced or where a plant has failed," the Siemens spokesperson said. "The virus has been removed in all the cases known to us."

He also said that according to global security standards, Microsoft software "may not be used to operate critical processes in plants".

It is not the first time that malware has been found that affects critical infrastructure, although most incidents occur accidentally, said Mr O'Murchu, when a virus intended to infect another system accidently wreaked havoc with real-world systems.

In 2009 the US government admitted that software had been found that could shut down the nation's power grid.

And Mr Hypponen said that he was aware of an attack - launched by infected USB sticks - against the military systems of a Nato country.

"Whether the attacker was successful, we don't know," he said.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11388018

Tuesday, September 21, 2010

Twitter Worm Bug

On Tuesday, a worm that had been previously fixed resurfaced on Twitter's website. This was a serious bug that led to many fast-spreading worms on the website. While the bug was contained later the same day, it caused havoc while it ran loose sending either a blacked-out message or Japanese pornography to all a user's followers. The bug managed to do such a great deal of damage because users did not need to click a link to spread the worm. Rather, they merely needed to hover their mouse over a specially written link in a Twitter message. This action executed a malicious code that spread the bug. Reports claim that one hundred thousand people, including Sarah Brown, former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown's wife, and White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, were affected by the bug.
This is not the first time that Twitter has fallen victim to a worm. Last year, a seventeen year old boy released a worm on the site. This time, a Japanese hacker discovered the problem. He attempted to contact Twitter for several days regarding the issue, but ended up deciding to test the problem with a worm code. The worm was then copied by many others. Representatives from Twitter report that the majority of the worms fell under prank or promotional categories, and there is no reason to believe that the problem could cause damage to users accounts or computers. They claim that there is no need to change passwords because account information was not compromised in the attack.
The cause of this event is two-fold. First, the worm was able to get through because there existed a basic Web programming error that allowed users to add JavaScript to their tweets. The problem could have been avoided if the corporation had noticed the problem itself, or listened to the Japanese hacker when he discovered the problem. The second cause was that a recent site update uncovered the previously discovered and fixed problem. The issue had been public knowledge since August 23 and had been fixed. However, the update uncovered the issue once more. Had Twitter looked into the update and what was happening they could have side-stepped the problems. Monitoring of the website could also have discovered the issue, as the Japanese hacker did.
Because of the lack of confidentiality, integrity, or availability breaches related to the worm, there is no action that Twitter users need to take in order to respond to the bug. However, if they are worried about future issues related to the site, they may want to contact Twitter directly or cancel their subscription to the site. The corporation, on the other hand, needs to respond by solving the problems that were listed above. This attack may not have compromised any sensitive data but a future attack may. By solving the problems of users having the ability to add JavaScript to tweets and issues from the update going unnoticed, Twitter can avoid future security breaches of this nature.

Monday, September 20, 2010

Google's New 2-Factor Authentication Feature

I was pretty shocked when I read this article and realized that I understood something that Google was doing, and why they were doing it, at least generally.

Four hours ago, Jason Kinkaid wrote, about two factor authentication, that "Today, Google is announcing that it’s bringing the security feature to its millions of users: the feature will be rolling out first for Google Apps Premiere, Education, and Government edition customers, with plans to bring it to all Google users (even those who aren’t using its Apps suite) in the next few months." The article incorporates some explanation of what "this new security feature" can offer users, like greater protection against phishing scams and having a password hacked.

I applaud Google for taking this step toward a higher level of security in their authentication process, but is it really going to do what it claims?

What Google says it will do is circumvent the inherently expensive existing methods of 2-factor authentication implemented primarily by major corporations and let the everyday person experience an increased sense of protection from the myriad internet scams and crimes out there. But in order to make 2-factor authentication something that doesn't compromise the high number of Google accounts, Google may be taking a risk in terms of the viability of their 2-factor authentication system. What word(s) stand out to you in the following description of the system?

"Google’s system doesn’t require a physical keycard. Instead, it relies on your mobile phone. First, you need to activate the optional feature from your settings page (...only available to certain Google Apps customers at first). Then, when you go to sign in to your Google account, you’ll first be asked to enter your password as usual. Next, you’ll be brought to a screen asking for a verification code [that] comes from your mobile phone, which you’ve previously linked up to your Google Account."

For me, the word "optional" makes this whole 2-factor authentication "system" more like a feature. It doesn't make using GMail safer. For example, say you use 2-factor authentication because you are smarter than the average bear, but your buddy doesn't know any better. What happens to you when your buddy's email account is hacked and you suddenly get some serious malware on your computer because you opened a link from an e-mail source you trusted? Not all Google accounts are safer. In fact not even the people who use 2-factor authentication are necessarily "safer."

Of course, it makes sense that the feature is optional, since it doesn't seem like Google has a way to ensure that users without smart phones or even mobile phones can pull this off. I think of my poor Grandmother. Kinkaid's article did say, however, that Google would give your landline a ring with the authentication code if you don't have a cell phone. But who is going to do that? And what about people who don't have phones (they're out there... think of people without the resources to afford a phone but were able to set up their own GMail accounts at a library computer, for example).

All in all, I'd say this 2-factor authentication from Google isn't all its cracked up to be.

Saturday, September 18, 2010

VA's New Security Measures

This article outlines the software applications and data scanning tools the Department of Veteran Affairs is implementing. This comes as an effort to “get visibility on every device on our network” and “have a complete view of the vulnerabilities in our enterprise,” says VA CIO Roger Baker. The systems, which cost about $50 million, will be able to identify laptops that exist on the network that are not encrypted, as well as enable security operations managers to monitor the status of hardware and software patches on all department computers. Additionally, the VA can then obtain electronic evidence when there are security breaches and automatically fix compromises when applicable. There are also increased security measures for contracting companies that help the VA provide healthcare and benefits. These include encryption and other policies that limit who can access veterans’ sensitive data.

The department has been under scrutiny over recent years because of several security breaches. The most notable is the one we discussed in class: in 2006, a laptop theft left the personal information of 26 million veterans in jeopardy. This year, six computers were reported lost in June and July, and in August, ten laptops were missing from the VA’s inventory. A handful of these had been encrypted, but some had not. The number, not to mention severity, of the incidents seems to be a red flag indicating something needs to be done to heighten security in order to prevent future problems. The new security measures that widen visibility in the whole department are steps in the right direction for the VA.

Of course this is easier said than done, but it seems like the VA has taken too long in implementing such measures. It has been four years since we first learned about the department’s vulnerabilities, so it seems like they would have done more to address this issue sooner. After the visibility software is in place, it is also important that managers and department officials monitor and appropriately deal with the software’s findings. It would be useless if the system identifies vulnerable computers, but managers do nothing about the threats. Also, the article suggests that the “sprawling, decentralized structure” of the VA contributes to the difficulty in effectively imposing security across the entire department. We read about the organizational problems of the VA in our case study, and perhaps there is a larger structural issue that the department needs to fix first.



Article cited:
http://www.govhealthit.com/newsitem.aspx?nid=74675


Also used:
http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20100917_6367.php?oref=topstory

Outage for JPMorgan Chase

On September 14th, news broke that JPMorgan was suffering from "technical difficulties", and there was an outage affecting customers' ability to access their account online. When a user tried to log on, he/she would encounter a simple message, "Log on Later." The online access was disabled Monday night and remained offline all of Tuesday. Some users even reported problems through Wednesday. Consumers have gotten accustomed to their ability to bank online, and any outage could cause unrest among the bank's customers.

JPMorgan, the second largest bank in America, said that the outage was due to a, "third party database company's software." They also stated that the problems were due to a failure in their authentication process. The bank claims that no customers' information has been compromised.

Although no sensitive information was leaked during the outage, the fact that accessibility was compromised is important. The exact cause of the break down is not exactly clear, but blaming a third party company for a authentication problem seems odd. I agree with Mr. Monash in the article when he says, "It's hard to imagine that they would outsource authentication - it's too core." Authentication is a very important step in access controls, especially for online banking.

JPMorgan needs to take action with respect to this event. Although the precise source of the outage is not clear, if this third party company has anything to do with it, I would strongly reconsider the relationship with them. If I were in charge of JPMorgan I would attempt to change the authentication process to our control. Then, if for some reason there were another outage, we would be able to get the system back online faster than 2 days.

JPMorgan's clients expect 100% accessibility of their own accounts, whether it is online, at an ATM, or even in the bank. If I were a customer, and this happened again, I would definitely be worried about the security of my bank and most likely change banks.

http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9186238/JPMorgan_Chase_deposits_blame_sort_of_for_outage_?taxonomyId=17
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9185420/JPMorgan_Chase_s_online_banking_site_crashes?taxonomyId=17

Friday, September 17, 2010

Stuxnet: The best of the worst

The Stuxnet worm is a recently found worm that has been labeled as "groundbreaking" by many antivirus professionals. This malware targets Windows machines that contain "supervisory control and data acquisition software" (SCADA). SCADA software is used to manage large, industrial systems of varyings sorts. Traced back as far as June of 2009, Stuxnet was a very sophisticated, precise, and impressive malware program. When the worm was first recognized, a patch was developed for the "zero-day" vulnerability that was found. A "zero-day" threats are simply malware code that exploits unpatched holes in software that software companies are not aware of. In the past month and a half the Stuxnet has been rediscovered and antivisus companies have found THREE more zero-day threats. This is unprecedented and is a first in the history of malware.

Using a USB to deliver the worm, Stuxnet contained a print spooler bug, two elevation of privilege (EoP) bugs, and a bug that exposed the same vulnerability as the familiar Conflicker worm (attacking the computer's usernames and passwords). In conjunction with all of these bugs, "the attack code seemed legitimate because the people behind Stuxnet had stolen at least two signed digital certificates." It is also believed that the code was so specific that the programmers would have needed the same hardware as the SCADA machines that they were targeting, and they also must have had knowledge about the specifics of the operations of the factory floor. The hackers also took efforts to minimize the risk of their discovery by creating counters so that the different infected USBs could not spread to more than three machines. This also ensured that the bug only spread to the necessary target machines.

The resources and financial backing that must have been necessary to support this attack indicate that this was too large scale to be a private attack. Similarly, there was no intention of stealing information, which also implies that this was not a private attack from some sort of competitor. The attack was targeted at Iran with the intention of controlling the machinery against the real operator's control. It appears to be above simple "industrial espionage."

The cause was a security breach via USB that compromised the authority to control the SCADA program on the targeted machines. In order to recovery and respond from this attack, I would recommended getting the patch updates that the antivirus companies produced for all four of the zer0-day attacks. Furthermore, if it is feasible, I would consider some stricter security software with more authentication processes. This particular case could have been avoided also if there was also a stricter policy regarding the use of the USB drive. In the future, it is important for these companies, and all companies, to be very aware of the potential for malware attacks. Although this high-tech and very intelligent attack is difficult to detect, it is always good to consistently update antivirus software and regularly test your major computer software.

http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9185919/Is_Stuxnet_the_best_malware_ever_?taxonomyId=17&pageNumber=1