Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Zeus "Mitmo" Attack
Zeus uses this information to send a text message to the person’s phone that contains a link to their “security certificate.” Once the user clicks on the link to download this “certificate,” the mobile version of Zeus is installed on their phone. This allows Zeus to monitor any incoming messages and installs a “backdoor” to accept and carry out commands received through text messages.
Once all of this occurs, the hacker has all he/she needs to make transactions with the user’s bank account. They simply have to log in using the stolen username and password and command the user’s mobile phone to send them the authentication text message so they can fill it in. This is sometimes referred to as a “Mitmo” or “Man in the Mobile” attack, and so far it has only affected Blackberry and Symbian phones.
I think that it is extremely important for users of online banking services to frequently monitor their account transactions and report anything that does not look familiar. Users should also be extremely wary about entering any kind of information (such as their phone model and number) into a website. If a website claims to be offering a security update for your phone, it would probably be wise to contact the phone company first to make sure that it is a valid update.
As for the phone companies, I think it would be helpful if they followed Apple’s lead in requiring all extra installations and applications to go directly through Apple (via iTunes) instead of any outside sources. As the article mentions, this has protected the iPhone from many of these kinds of problems. It is also important for banks to continue to create new and more secure ways of authentication for transactions in order to remain one step ahead of the hackers.
http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Banking-trojan-ZeuS-homes-in-on-SMS-TAN-process-1097104.html
http://www.scmagazineuk.com/mobiles-used-by-zeus-as-sms-messages-are-used-to-deliver-one-time-passwords/article/179764/
Thursday, September 23, 2010
Stuxnet worm 'targeted high-value Iranian assets'
Stuxnet's complexity suggests it could only have been written by a "nation state", some researchers have claimed.
It is believed to be the first-known worm designed to target real-world infrastructure such as power stations, water plants and industrial units.
It was first detected in June and has been intensely studied ever since.
"The fact that we see so many more infections in Iran than anywhere else in the world makes us think this threat was targeted at Iran and that there was something in Iran that was of very, very high value to whomever wrote it," Liam O'Murchu of security firm Symantec, who has tracked the worm since it was first detected, told BBC News.
Some have speculated that it could have been aimed at disrupting Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant or the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz.
However, Mr O'Murchu and others, such as security expert Bruce Schneier, have said that there was currently not enough evidence to draw conclusions about what its intended target was or who had written it.
India and Indonesia have also seen relatively high infection rates, according to Symantec.
'Rare package'
Stuxnet was first detected in June by a security firm based in Belarus, but may have been circulating since 2009.
Unlike most viruses, the worm targets systems that are traditionally not connected to the internet for security reasons.
Instead it infects Windows machines via USB keys - commonly used to move files around - infected with malware.
Once it has infected a machine on a firm's internal network, it seeks out a specific configuration of industrial control software made by Siemens.
Siemens factory The worm searches out industrial systems made by Siemens
Once hijacked, the code can reprogram so-called PLC (programmable logic control) software to give attached industrial machinery new instructions.
"[PLCs] turn on and off motors, monitor temperature, turn on coolers if a gauge goes over a certain temperature," said Mr O'Murchu.
"Those have never been attacked before that we have seen."
If it does not find the specific configuration, the virus remains relatively benign.
However, the worm has also raised eyebrows because of the complexity of the code used and the fact that it bundled so many different techniques into one payload.
"There are a lot of new, unknown techniques being used that we have never seen before," he said These include tricks to hide itself on PLCs and USB sticks as well as up to six different methods that allowed it to spread.
In addition, it exploited several previously unknown and unpatched vulnerabilities in Windows, known as zero-day exploits.
"It is rare to see an attack using one zero-day exploit," Mikko Hypponen, chief research officer at security firm F-Secure, told BBC News. "Stuxnet used not one, not two, but four."
He said cybercriminals and "everyday hackers" valued zero-day exploits and would not "waste" them by bundling so many together.
Microsoft has so far patched two of the flaws.
'Nation state'
Mr O'Murchu agreed and said that his analysis suggested that whoever had created the worm had put a "huge effort" into it.
"It is a very big project, it is very well planned, it is very well funded," he said. "It has an incredible amount of code just to infect those machines."
"There have been no instances where production operations have been influenced or where a plant has failed” Siemen's spokesperson
His analysis is backed up by other research done by security firms and computer experts.
"With the forensics we now have it is evident and provable that Stuxnet is a directed sabotage attack involving heavy insider knowledge," said Ralph Langer, an industrial computer expert in an analysis he published on the web.
"This is not some hacker sitting in the basement of his parents' house. To me, it seems that the resources needed to stage this attack point to a nation state," he wrote.
Mr Langer, who declined to be interviewed by the BBC, has drawn a lot of attention for suggesting that Stuxnet could have been targeting the Bushehr nuclear plant.
In particular, he has highlighted a photograph reportedly taken inside the plant that suggests it used the targeted control systems, although they were "not properly licensed and configured".
Mr O'Murchu said no firm conclusions could be drawn.
However, he hopes that will change when he releases his analysis at a conference in Vancouver next week.
"We are not familiar with what configurations are used in different industries," he said.
Instead, he hopes that other experts will be able to pore over their research and pinpoint the exact configuration needed and where that is used.
'Limited success'
A spokesperson for Siemens, the maker of the targeted systems, said it would not comment on "speculations about the target of the virus".
He said that Iran's nuclear power plant had been built with help from a Russian contractor and that Siemens was not involved.
"Siemens was neither involved in the reconstruction of Bushehr or any nuclear plant construction in Iran, nor delivered any software or control system," he said. "Siemens left the country nearly 30 years ago."
Siemens said that it was only aware of 15 infections that had made their way on to control systems in factories, mostly in Germany. Symantec's geographical analysis of the worm's spread also looked at infected PCs.
"There have been no instances where production operations have been influenced or where a plant has failed," the Siemens spokesperson said. "The virus has been removed in all the cases known to us."
He also said that according to global security standards, Microsoft software "may not be used to operate critical processes in plants".
It is not the first time that malware has been found that affects critical infrastructure, although most incidents occur accidentally, said Mr O'Murchu, when a virus intended to infect another system accidently wreaked havoc with real-world systems.
In 2009 the US government admitted that software had been found that could shut down the nation's power grid.
And Mr Hypponen said that he was aware of an attack - launched by infected USB sticks - against the military systems of a Nato country.
"Whether the attacker was successful, we don't know," he said.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11388018
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
Twitter Worm Bug
Monday, September 20, 2010
Google's New 2-Factor Authentication Feature
I was pretty shocked when I read this article and realized that I understood something that Google was doing, and why they were doing it, at least generally.
Four hours ago, Jason Kinkaid wrote, about two factor authentication, that "Today, Google is announcing that it’s bringing the security feature to its millions of users: the feature will be rolling out first for Google Apps Premiere, Education, and Government edition customers, with plans to bring it to all Google users (even those who aren’t using its Apps suite) in the next few months." The article incorporates some explanation of what "this new security feature" can offer users, like greater protection against phishing scams and having a password hacked.
I applaud Google for taking this step toward a higher level of security in their authentication process, but is it really going to do what it claims?
What Google says it will do is circumvent the inherently expensive existing methods of 2-factor authentication implemented primarily by major corporations and let the everyday person experience an increased sense of protection from the myriad internet scams and crimes out there. But in order to make 2-factor authentication something that doesn't compromise the high number of Google accounts, Google may be taking a risk in terms of the viability of their 2-factor authentication system. What word(s) stand out to you in the following description of the system?
"Google’s system doesn’t require a physical keycard. Instead, it relies on your mobile phone. First, you need to activate the optional feature from your settings page (...only available to certain Google Apps customers at first). Then, when you go to sign in to your Google account, you’ll first be asked to enter your password as usual. Next, you’ll be brought to a screen asking for a verification code [that] comes from your mobile phone, which you’ve previously linked up to your Google Account."
For me, the word "optional" makes this whole 2-factor authentication "system" more like a feature. It doesn't make using GMail safer. For example, say you use 2-factor authentication because you are smarter than the average bear, but your buddy doesn't know any better. What happens to you when your buddy's email account is hacked and you suddenly get some serious malware on your computer because you opened a link from an e-mail source you trusted? Not all Google accounts are safer. In fact not even the people who use 2-factor authentication are necessarily "safer."
Of course, it makes sense that the feature is optional, since it doesn't seem like Google has a way to ensure that users without smart phones or even mobile phones can pull this off. I think of my poor Grandmother. Kinkaid's article did say, however, that Google would give your landline a ring with the authentication code if you don't have a cell phone. But who is going to do that? And what about people who don't have phones (they're out there... think of people without the resources to afford a phone but were able to set up their own GMail accounts at a library computer, for example).
All in all, I'd say this 2-factor authentication from Google isn't all its cracked up to be.
Saturday, September 18, 2010
VA's New Security Measures
The department has been under scrutiny over recent years because of several security breaches. The most notable is the one we discussed in class: in 2006, a laptop theft left the personal information of 26 million veterans in jeopardy. This year, six computers were reported lost in June and July, and in August, ten laptops were missing from the VA’s inventory. A handful of these had been encrypted, but some had not. The number, not to mention severity, of the incidents seems to be a red flag indicating something needs to be done to heighten security in order to prevent future problems. The new security measures that widen visibility in the whole department are steps in the right direction for the VA.
Of course this is easier said than done, but it seems like the VA has taken too long in implementing such measures. It has been four years since we first learned about the department’s vulnerabilities, so it seems like they would have done more to address this issue sooner. After the visibility software is in place, it is also important that managers and department officials monitor and appropriately deal with the software’s findings. It would be useless if the system identifies vulnerable computers, but managers do nothing about the threats. Also, the article suggests that the “sprawling, decentralized structure” of the VA contributes to the difficulty in effectively imposing security across the entire department. We read about the organizational problems of the VA in our case study, and perhaps there is a larger structural issue that the department needs to fix first.
Article cited:
http://www.govhealthit.com/newsitem.aspx?nid=74675
Also used:
http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20100917_6367.php?oref=topstory